U.S. Supreme Court decision on extent to which a state may seek reimbursement of medical costs through a Medicaid lien following judgment against or settlement with a third party tortfeasor
ADHS v. Ahlborn (Special)

 

Though rendered in 2006, we recently received a request to brief and discuss the practical impact the United States Supreme Court opinion in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. Ahlborn (2006) 547 U.S. ___; 126 S.Ct. 1752 might have on settlement negotiations in personal injury cases. In Ahlborn, the Court was asked to determine the enforceability of an Arkansas law that required a tort plaintiff who received medical care through Medicaid to fully reimburse the Department of Health Services (ADHS) for all its costs, even if the amount of the lien for those costs exceeded the portion of the settlement or judgment that represented the cost of medical care rendered. The Arkansas law provided that the ADHS was entitled to full reimbursement, even if the reimbursement monies came from that portion of the settlement or judgment intended to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering, lost wages, etc. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Arkansas law was contrary to federal Medicaid laws and therefore unenforceable. Because federal law prohibits Medicaid liens on “personal property,” liens by States to recover Medicaid expenditures may only reach that portion or percentage of the settlement or judgment that represents payment for past medical expenses.

Heidi Ahlborn was a 19-year old college student when she was severely injured in an automobile accident. Though she had a claim of uncertain value against the parties allegedly responsible for her injuries, her assets were insufficient to pay for her medical and rehabilitative care. Petitioner ADHS determined she was eligible for medical assistance and paid providers $215,645.30 on her behalf under the State’s Medicaid plan. ADHS required Ahlborn to fill out a questionnaire about her accident and asked her attorney to provide updates on any litigation. The letters indicated that ADHS had a claim to reimbursement for any payments received from a third party who may be liable for her injuries, and that no settlement shall be finalized without giving ADHS notice.

Ahlborn’s suit for personal injuries against two alleged tortfeasors sought compensation for her injuries and included claims for past and future medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, among other things. ADHS was neither named as a party nor formally notified of the suit. Ahlborn’s attorney did keep ADHS informed of issues regarding insurance coverage as they became known.

About a year after Ahlborn filed her lawsuit, ADHS intervened in the action to assert a lien on any third-party recovery Ahlborn might obtain. About 8 months later, ADHS asked Ahlborn’s attorney to notify the agency if there was a hearing in the matter. The matter settled before trial or other hearing for $550,000, and the parties did not allocate the settlement between the various categories of claimed damages. ADHS did not participate, nor did it ask to participate in settlement negotiations; it did not ask to re-open the matter following the finalization of the settlement. It did assert its lien, though, in the amount of the $215,645.30 spent on medical care for Ahlborn.

Ahlborn thereafter sought declaratory relief on the grounds that “the lien violated the federal Medicaid laws insofar as its satisfaction would require depletion of compensation for injuries other than past medical expenses.” Interestingly, to help the District Court with its analysis, the parties (Ahlborn and ADHS) stipulated that the total cost of Ahlborn’s claims could be “reasonably valued” at $3,040,708.18 and that the $550,000 settlement represented approximately one-sixth of that amount. The parties also stipulated that if Ahlborn’s interpretation of federal law was correct, the percentage of the settlement that could be allocated to medical costs would be $35,581.47 (approximately one-sixth of $215,645.30). If the State’s interpretation was correct, however, and the Arkansas law did not conflict with the federal Medicaid laws, it would be entitled to reimbursement of the nearly quarter-million dollar lien.

After both sides filed summary judgment motions, the District Court agreed with the ADHS and ordered Ahlborn to pay the $215,645.30 lien. Thereafter, Ahlborn appealed and the Eight Circuit court agreed with her and reversed. Because of a conflict among Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then affirmed. The Supreme Court held that under federal Medicaid laws, a state cannot seek reimbursement of more than the portion of a judgment or settlement that represents payment for medical expenses.

The court went through a detailed analysis of the federal Medicaid laws and explained why the Arkansas law was inconsistent with them. It noted the “State, through this statute, claims an entitlement to more than just that portion of a judgment or settlement that represents payment for medical expenses. It claims a right to recover the entirety of the costs it paid on the Medicaid recipient’s behalf. Accordingly, if, for example, a recipient sues alone and settles her entire action against a third-party tortfeasor for $20,000 and ADHS has paid that amount or more to medical provides on her behalf, ADHS gets the whole settlement and the recipient is left with nothing. This is so even when the parties to the settlement allocate damages between medical costs, on the one hand, and other injuries like lost wages, on the other. The same rule would also apply, it seems, if the recovery were the result not of a settlement, but of a jury verdict. In that case, under the Arkansas statute, ADHS could recover the full $20,000 in the face of a jury allocation of, say, only $10,000 for medical expenses.”

The court found the State’s law not only has no support in federal law but, “in fact squarely conflicts with the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid laws” which limits the amount recoupable via a lien to recovery of payments for medical care. The court held that ADHS could not lay claim to more than the portion of a settlement or judgment that represented medical expenses. Federal anti-lien provisions actually precluded the attachment or encumbrance of the remainder of plaintiff’s settlement.

ADHS argued, among other things, that there is an “inherent danger of manipulation in cases where the parties to a tort case settle without judicial oversight or input from the state,” an argument the Supreme Court found unpersuasive. In this case, the Court observed ADHS stipulated that only $35,581.47 of Ahlborn’s settlement proceeds were properly “designated as payments for medical costs. Even in the absence of such a post-settlement agreement, though, the risk that parties to a tort suit will allocate away the State’s interest can be avoided either by obtaining the State’s advance agreement to an allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for decision.”

As a practical matter, the presence of a lien can impair efforts to settle a case. Given the language of the Supreme Court in Ahlborn about “allocating away the State’s interest,” it does not seem prudent to take the position that no settlement money should be allocated for medical costs in a case where Medi-Cal has actually paid providers and made a lien for those sums. Ahlborn stands for the proposition that a state cannot over-reach when trying to seek reimbursement for Medicaid costs by taking more than the portion of the damages award or settlement that represents medical costs, not that the State is not entitled to anything simply because the total damages may be low and the recovery by plaintiff will be low if he or she is compelled to pay the lien.

The Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that a workable approach to reaching a successful settlement in a case where there is a lien might be to establish what plaintiff’s total damages claims are, what portion or percentage of those damages is represented by the proposed settlement (in Ahlborn the settlement was approximately 1/6 of the reasonable value of the total damages claim), what portion of plaintiff’s total damages are made up of past medical expenses (the total amount paid by Medi-Cal) and then apply the total damages-to-settlement-amount ratio to reduce the Medi-Cal lien proportionally. There would seem to be great incentive on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys to work with defense counsel to come to some agreement about 1) the “reasonable value” of the total damages in the case; 2) the total damages-to-settlement ratio and 3) what portion of the total damages claim is made up of past medical expenses and will be reduced by the total damages-to-settlement-amount ratio.

However, an agreement between the plaintiff and alleged tortfeasor may not be enough to form the basis of a finding that the case has been “reasonably valued” from the State’s perspective. Given the Court’s language in Ahlborn, parties may want to either involve the state in the stipulation process or obtain a court order that affirms the appropriateness of their stipulation to the “reasonable value” of the entire claim and/or what portion or percentage of that claim can be attributed to past medical expenses. In Ahlborn, the ADHS stipulated to the “reasonable value” of the claimed damages and what portion of damages could be allocated to past medical care (1/6th); if Medi-Cal can be involved in the stipulation process about the “reasonable value” of the case and the portion of claimed damages represented by medical costs, then a judicial determination of the “reasonableness” would probably be unnecessary.

Of course, having said all of that, there is nothing in Ahlborn that precludes a plaintiff’s attorney from trying to convince Medi-Cal to waive its lien entirely, or take a few cents on the dollar in satisfaction. A request for a waiver might get some traction with the State in a case where past medical expenses are substantial, but the settlement value on the case is relatively small (perhaps because the bulk of the plaintiff’s non-past medical damages are general in nature and limited by MICRA, and/or the other specials in the case are nominal). Again, stipulating to a total “reasonable value” of the case and the proportional amount of past medical costs with plaintiff’s counsel would be useful to illustrate to the State how pursuit of a lien for the full amount of past medical costs will defeat any chance of settlement and would cause the plaintiff to incur the additional costs of trial with no guarantee of any recovery for plaintiff or Medi-Cal.

 

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